Now that we have completed our brief detour into what the Supreme Court could maybe do with the BP oil spill case if it decides to do anything with it, we resume our ongoing series on what law applies when you incorporate software into your products.
We take a break from our series on incorporating software into your products to talk about a case the Supreme Court is considering that may prove significant to manufacturers. This column is not typically the place to go for predictions on what the Supreme Court may do, but I want to bring this case to your attention, and circumstances are forcing me to do it now rather than later.
In the first installment of this series, we discussed the general scope of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and, in the broadest terms, whether and when the purchase or sale of software falls within that scope. In this installment, we’ll move toward our goal of understanding when your purchase or sale of software is governed by Article 2 by looking at how the question has been treated by various courts over time.
This column spends a lot of time talking about Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. A lot of time. That’s because it’s a column directed to manufacturers, and Article 2, generally speaking, deals with sales of goods.But that “generally speaking” glosses over quite a bit, and it can cause us to miss important issues.
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently analyzed whether a loan officer owes a borrower a fiduciary duty in a home mortgage transaction. Dallaire v. Bank of Am., ___N.C.___, 747 S.E.2d 535 (2013), decided June 12, 2014, No. 51PA13. Jacques and Fernande Dallaire (“Borrowers”) purchased a home as their primary residence in 1998. Seven years later they filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to unrelated business debts.
Remember when I wrote a glowing column about a Master Development and Supply Agreement Apple and its lawyers drafted? It was one of the most-read posts I’ve written, so I bet a good number of you do. Since the post was so popular, and since there have been some, well, we’ll say “unanticipated consequences” for Apple, I thought it warranted some follow up.
The Third Circuit recently affirmed denial of certification of a class of patients who alleged that the medical testing company, Quest Diagnostics, Inc., routinely overbilled patients. See Grandalski, et a. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., et al., No. 13-4329 (September 11, 2014). Quest Diagnostics is the country’s largest provider of medical testing.
There’s an unwritten rule that if you blog about manufacturing, you must blog about the Internet of Things. I blog about manufacturing, so here we are.
This post comes to you based on a story by the always-excellent Matt Levine of BloombergView. Evidently Apple loaned a company called GT Advanced Technologies a bunch of money so GTAT could develop and supply Apple with sapphire screens for a long time. Anyway, there may have been a default under part of that agreement, and GTAT filed for bankruptcy protection because that default was going to ruin everything (at least according to industry speculation).
A thing I like to do is approach people at parties and other gatherings and ask them if they know they can use contracts to shorten some statutes of limitations. Usually I get quizzical looks, but I guess the context just worked better when I mentioned it while speaking at a recent event put on by the Kansas Bar Association. An especially attentive participant asked a good follow-up question that warrants some discussion: can you shorten the limitations period for fraud?