In a recent decision that may affect any company that sells products or services using telemarketers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc. in favor of a product seller, holding the seller was not vicariously liable for calls made by a telemarketer in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) because the telemarketer was an independent contractor.
In a new decision that may have important implications for telemarketers and others using automatic dialing systems, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in the case of Schweitzer v. Comenity Bank that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) allows a consumer to partially revoke his or her consent to receive automated telemarketing calls.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California recently issued an order denying class certification to a nationwide putative class of consumers against The CBE Group, Inc. (“CBE”), which alleged that CBE made over 500 million calls to these consumers’ cell phones without their prior express consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (“TCPA”). Blair, et al. v. The CBE Group, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00134-MMA-WVG (S.D. Cal. August 26, 2015).
One thing that telemarketers and other companies that communicate with their customers by calling their customer’s cellphones crave is clarity under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. The Sixth Circuit recently shed some light on the meaning of “prior express consent” under the TCPA in connection with calls by a creditor to its debtor’s cellphone in the case of Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc., No. 14-4168 (6th Cir. August 21, 2015).
In the case of Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 14-14200 (August 21, 2015), the Eleventh Circuit had occasion to decide whether a bank that collects on defaulted debt it acquired from another bank is a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p.
I recently wrote about a decision from a federal district court in Alabama that sidestepped the Eleventh Circuit’s Crawford decision by finding that the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) were in irreconcilable conflict, and the FDCPA gave way to the Code on the question of whether the mere act of filing a proof of claim on a stale debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy violated the FDCPA.
In the case of Isaac, et al. v. RMB, Inc., et al., No. 14-11560 (11th Cir. March 17, 2015), the Eleventh Circuit recently upheld summary judgment in favor of a debt collector based on the affirmative defense of bona fide error. The case presents a good opportunity to see what type of evidence is needed to prevail on the defense.
In a 2014 decision rued by debt collectors everywhere, the Eleventh Circuit in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) ruled that filing a proof of claim to collect a time-barred debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
In Lori Jo Vincent, et al. v. The Money Store, Inc. et al, No. 03 cv 2876 (S.D.N.Y. February 2, 2015), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York certified a class of home mortgage borrowers who defaulted on their loans and received uniform “breach letters” from a law firm sent on behalf of the defendant mortgage servicing company and the defendant lenders.
In a case that will likely cause debt collectors seeking to collect time-barred obligations grave concern, the Sixth Circuit recently ruled that making an offer to settle a time-barred debt at a discount could mislead an unsophisticated consumer to believe the debt could be enforced in court in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Buchanan v. Northland Group, Inc., No. 13-2523 (January 13, 2015).